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I.

INTRODUCTION

Our current policy is nuclear deterrence, whereby we threaten the use
of nuclear weapons against any adversary who uses nuclear, chemical,
biological, or even massive conventional weapons against us. I'm going to
address the lawfulness of our potential use of nuclear weapons pursuant to
that policy.
Both the defenders, including the United States, and the opponents of
the nuclear weapons regime agree that the international law rules of
discrimination, proportionality, and necessity apply to nuclear weapons.
The rule of discrimination makes it unlawful to use weapons whose likely
or foreseeable effects cannot discriminate between military and civilian
targets. The rule of proportionality makes it unlawful to use weapons
whose probable effects upon combatant or non-combatant persons or
objects would likely be disproportionate to the value of the military
objective. The rule of necessity makes it unlawful to use weapons
involving a level of force not necessary in the circumstances to achieve the
military objective.
Both the United States and the opponents of the nuclear weapons
regime further agree that it is unlawful under these rules to use weapons
whose effects will be uncontrollable. Weapons whose effects are not
controllable cannot lawfully be used under international law, and this is
recognized in the military manuals of the United States armed services,
recognized in manuals used for training and disciplining of United States
personnel, and often cited by the United States as a reliable statement of
international law.
UNCONTROLLABILITY UNDER RULE OF DISCRIMINATION
The Air Force Commander's Handbook states that weapons that are
"incapable of being controlled enough to direct them against a military
II.

objective" are unlawful.'

The Air Force Manual on International Law

defines indiscriminate weapons as those "incapable of being controlled,
through design or function," such that they "cannot, with any degree of
certainty, be directed at military objectives." 2
In its military manuals, the United States has acknowledged that the
scope of this prohibition extends to the effects of the use of a weapon. The
1. THE U.S. DEPT. OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-34, COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 6-2 (1980) [hereinafter THE AIR FORCE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK].
2. THE U.S. DEPT. OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31, INT'L LAWTHE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 6-3 (1976) [hereinafter THE AIR
FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW].
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Air Force Manual on InternationalLaw states that indiscriminate weapons
include those which, while subject to being directed at military objectives,
"may have otherwise uncontrollable effects so as to cause disproportionate
civilian injuries or damage." 3 The manual states that "uncontrollable"
refers to effects "which escape in time or space from the control of the
user as to necessarily create risks to civilian persons or objects excessive in
relation to the military advantage anticipated."4 It is noteworthy that this
prohibition encompasses the causing of risks, not just injury.
As a "universally agreed illustration of an indiscriminate weapon,"
The Air Force Manual on International Law cites biological weapons,
noting that the uncontrollable effects from such weapons "may include
injury to the civilian population of other States as well as injury to an
enemy's civilian population." 5 The Naval/Marine Commander's Handbook
states that such weapons are "inherently indiscriminate and
6
uncontrollable."
The Air Force Manual on InternationalLaw further cites Germany's
World War II V-1 rockets, with their "extremely primitive guidance
systems", and Japanese incendiary balloons, without any guidance
systems. 7 The manual states that the term "indiscriminate" refers to the
"inherent characteristics of the weapon, when used, which renders [sic] it
incapable of being directed at specific military objectives or of a nature to
necessarily cause disproportionate injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects. "8
As an example of an indiscriminate weapon, The Air Force
Commander's Handbook similarly cites the use of unpowered and
uncontrolled balloons to carry bombs, since such weapons are "incapable
of being directed against a military objective.-"
III. UNCONTROLLABILITY UNDER RULE OF NECESSITY
The requirement that the level of force implicit in the use of a weapon
be controllable and controlled by the user is a natural implication of the
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6.
U.S. DEPT. OF THE NAVY ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 10-21, Naval Warfare Publication 9 (Rev.A,
Oct. 5, 1989) (this handbook was adopted by the U.S. Marine Corps as FLEET MANUAL FMFM
1-10) [hereinafter THE NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK].
7.

See THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 6-3.

8. Id. at 6-9, n.7.
9.

THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1,at 6-1.
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necessity requirement. If a State cannot control the level of destructiveness
of a weapon then it cannot assure that the use of the weapon will involve
only such a level of destructiveness as is necessary in the circumstances.
The Air Force Manual on International Law recognizes as a basic
requirement of necessity "that the force used is capable of being and is in
fact regulated by the user."10
IV.

UNCONTROLLABILITY UNDER RULE OF PROPORTIONALITY

So also, if the State using a weapon is unable to control the effects of
the weapon, it is unable to evaluate whether the effects would satisfy the
requirement of being proportionate to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated from the attack or to assure such limitation of

effects.

The Air Force Manual on International Law notes that the

requirement of proportionality prohibits "uncontrollable effects against
one's own combatants, civilians or property.""
V.

UNITED STATES POSITION

It is the formal United States position that under these rules of
discrimination, proportionality, and necessity some uses of nuclear
weapons would be lawful and that others would be unlawful-and that the
lawfulness of any potential use is something that has to be evaluated in the
context of that use. The United States' position is that the effects of
nuclear weapons, or at least of the smaller, ostensibly tactical nuclear
weapons, are controllable.
In its written and oral presentations to the International
Court of
Case,'"
defending
Advisory
Weapons
Nuclear
Justice (ICJ) in the recent
nuclear weapons, the United States argued that, even if nuclear attacks
directed at significant numbers of large urban area targets or at a
substantial number of military targets would be unlawful, a small number
of accurate attacks by low-yield weapons against an equally small number
10. THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 1-6.
11.

Id. at6-2. See also id. at 5-10.

12. International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 827 (July 1996) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion]. All but five of the fifteen ICJ opinions, including the holding of the Court, are
available at 35 I.L.M. 809 (1996). The remaining five, the declarations of Judges Bedjaoui,
Herczegh and Bravo, and the individual opinions of Judges Guillaume and Ranjeva, appear at 35

I.L.M 1343 (1996). The opinions and various submissions to the Court are also available at the
Court's own website at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Mar. 16, 2002) or at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/world (last visited Mar. 16, 2002). Some of the same materials are
also available in THE CASE AGAINST THE BOMB (Roger S. Clark & Madeleine Sanns eds.,

1996).
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of military targets in non-urban areas would not be. The United States
further argued that nuclear weapons can reliably be targeted at specific
military objectives.
VI. DEFENSE OF SMALL-SCALE USE:
Let's take first the United States' defense of small scale use. If you
look at the United States nuclear arsenal, you will see that it is
predominately made up of large strategic nuclear weapons, not the smallscale ostensibly tactical nuclear weapons the United States defended.
VII. PRECISION TARGETING
The United States position on its ability to control the effects of
nuclear weapons through precision targeting does not withstand analysis.
First of all, our ability to hit specific targets with precision is only
statistical. We can deliver a warhead to a particular target with startlingly
high probability, but where any particular warhead will end up is far from
certain.
Even more importantly, even if we deliver the nuclear warhead with
precision to the intended target, we cannot control the radiation effects.
They are subject to natural forces of the environment, wind and weather.
This applies to even the use of a so-called small-scale nuclear weapon.
The most cogent argument the proponents of nuclear weapons make is
that under certain circumstances the effects of nuclear weapons might be
controllable because of the remote area of use and the limited nature of the
weapons used.
Michael Matheson, sitting to my left, one of the chief lawyers
representing the United States before the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Case, has pointed in his writings to an example given by the
United States judge on the court, Judge Schwebel, now the President of the
court, in his opinion in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Case-the use of a
nuclear depth charge to destroy a submarine that is about to fire nucleararmed missiles.
It seems to me that that kind of argument fundamentally misses the
point as to the risks of nuclear weapons use and as to nature of the
challenge to the rule of law that nuclear weapons present.
Mr. Matheson and Judge Schwebel are correct that if one
hypothesizes a laboratory-type circumstance in which there are no other
factors, just the submarine about to launch nuclear weapons and our ability
to take the submarine out before the use, and assumes a remote
environment where civilians will not be at risk, such a use sounds as if it
must be lawful.
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But is it not clear that such a scenario is unrealistic to the point of not
being a legitimate basis upon which to ground the legal analysis? For if
the adversary State has one submarine with nuclear weapons, it most likely
has other submarines carrying nuclear weapons; if the adversary State has
nuclear weapons in submarines, it most likely has other nuclear weapons
which it is capable of delivering by land and sea-based missile, by aircraft,
and otherwise; if the adversary State has such nuclear weapons and the
means to delivery them, it may well have chemical and biological weapons
and the means to deliver them; and if the adversary State has nuclear
weapons, it will likely have allies or potential allies who have nuclear,
chemical, and/or biological weapons. In addition, in the real world, any
use of nuclear weapons, in the types of circumstances in which we might
resort to such weapons, would likely carry with it a high risk of escalation;
our adversaries would likely respond with nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons.
So, in the real world, this hypothesized strike on the submarine will
likely not be as limited as it at first appeared. In real terms, this scenario
will potentially put us right in the middle of widescale use by us and our
adversaries of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The kind of
situation that threatens effects of a apocalyptic nature.
Outside the courtroom, the United States. recognizes the potential
uncontrollability of the effects of nuclear weapons. This can be seen from
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Joint Pub 3-12, Doctrine for Joint
Nuclear Operations, setting forth the current operational planning for the
integrated use by United States forces of nuclear weapons in conjunction
with conventional weapons:' 3 "[Tihere can be no assurances that a conflict
involving weapons of mass destruction could be controllable or would be
of short duration."
Outside the courtroom, the United States has also recognized the
disproportionate nature of the damage United States nuclear policy
threatens. The Joint Chief of Staff's Nuclear Weapons Joint Operations
manual states:
US [sic] nuclear forces serve to deter the use of WMD
["weapons of mass destruction," including chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons] across the spectrum of
military operations. From a massive exchange of nuclear
13.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, PUB 3-12, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

(Dec. 15, 1995), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_12.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2002).

See also CHARLES J. MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR WEAPON AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD Ch. 2, n.75, ch. 17, nn.38-53, ch. 18, n.56, chs. 26, 27
and accompanying text (2000).
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weapons to limited use on a regional battlefield, US [sic]
nuclear capabilities must confront an enemy with risks of
unacceptable damage and disproportionate loss should the
14
enemy choose to introduce WMD into a conflict.
I submit that virtually any use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful
under these rules, such that the use of nuclear weapons is per se unlawful.
I submit that it is clear that the effects of nuclear weapons are
uncontrollable and hence that the use of such weapons would be unlawful.
I further submit that, by our defense of the potential lawfulness of our
limited use of small-scale tactical nuclear weapons against remote targets,
we are not only justifying a huge arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons not
addressed by our legal theory but also raising the level of risk of possible
widescale use of nuclear weapons.
Rather than recognizing that the scale of the effects of these weapons
exceeds what could be unlawful under any view of the law, we are
legitimizing the possession, threat of use, and the potential actual use of
these weapons.
To the argument, again made by Mr. Matheson, that the threat of use
of these weapons can itself protect us against some other State's use of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, I submit that, while the point
may be valid in limited circumstances, the potential gain from such
deterrence is substantially outweighed by the risks created by our
legitimization of these weapons.
Mr. Matheson's support of threats is also inconsistent with the legal
rule that it is unlawful to threaten that which it is unlawful to do. As the
ICJ stated, "If an envisaged use of weapons would not meet the
requirements of humanitarian law, a threat to engage in such use would
also be contrary to that law."'5 The Court noted that "no State-whether
or not it defended the policy of deterrence-suggested to the Court that it
would be lawful to threaten to use force if the use of force contemplated
would be illegal."16 The United States, as well as not disputing the
unlawfulness of a threat to commit an unlawful act, stated to the Court:
[E]ach of the Permanent Members of the Security Council
has made an immense commitment of human and material
resources to acquire and maintain stocks of nuclear
weapons and their delivery systems, and many other States
14. DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 1-2 (emphasis
omitted).
15.

Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 827. See also id. at 823.

16. Id. at 823.
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have decided to rely for their security on these nuclear
capabilities. If these weapons could not lawfully be used in
individual or collective self-defense under any
circumstances, there would be no credible threat of such
use in response to aggression and deterrentpolicies would
be futile and meaningless. In this sense, it is impossible to
separate the policy of deterrence from the legality of the
use of the means of deterrence.' 7
Our legitimization of these weapons has innumerable effects of the
most dire sort: we develop, purchase, and maintain such weapons for use,
often on a fast trigger; we threaten that we will use the weapons, causing
other States to develop, purchase, and maintain their own nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, often on even more of a hair trigger; we
foster proliferation; by training our personnel and setting contingency plans
in place for use of these weapons, we raise the likelihood of intentional,
unintentional, and mistaken use, and, by emphasizing nuclear weapons, we
may even hold back from developing conventional capabilities, or
stockpiles, that would both better serve our military needs, and provide the
means for the lawful conducting of armed conflict.
With the dread events of September 1lth, we have now seen the
effects of weapons of mass destruction or something approximating them,
at first hand, have looked them in the face, breathed the air. And what we
have seen are effects, sickeningly horrific as they are, that are far less than
the destruction to civilians and civilian society that could result from uses
of nuclear weapons we are threatening every day and have for over fifty
years by our polices of nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction.
Indeed, to the extent our policy is or at times has been mutual assured
destruction, we threaten or have threatened just this kind of thing. The
very reason given by the Bush Administration pre-September llth, for
national missile defense-that our policy of mutual assured destruction,
which the Administration seemed to be assuming is our current policy, is
immoral and unacceptable-makes the point. Mutual assured destruction is
a policy of terror.
I don't mean to suggest that we would ever intentionally conduct a
nuclear strike against large civilian buildings in the middle of an urban
area, but the effects of these weapons are so vast and so uncontrollable,
and so many military targets are located in the vicinity of urban areas, that
under our current policies, military personnel training, and contingency
17. Op. I.C.J. (1995), Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, available at http://www.icicii.org/iciwww/icases/iunan/iunan cr/iUNAN iCR9534 19951115.PDF.
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plans, we could end up causing such effects in the course of strikes aimed
at military targets.
By our legitimization of the potential use of nuclear weapons, we are
fostering proliferation and the other types of effects I alluded to earlierand increasing the likelihood that at some time, under some set of
circumstances, intentional or not, these weapons will be used on a
broadscale and escalatory basis by combatants in war, causing catastrophic
damage that could make the survivors nostalgic for the limited strikes of
September 1lth and the limited nature of the current anthrax attacks. Our
current policies contribute to the risk that eventually some States will use
nuclear weapons against major urban centers. Here is the United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff statement setting forth our potential uses of nuclear
weapons:
The Joint Chief of Staffs Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear
Operations, issued as recently as February 1996, states:
Nuclear operations can be successful in achieving US
military objectives if they are used in the appropriate
situation and administered properly . . .Nuclear weapons
have many purposes, but should only be used after
deterrence has failed . . . The purpose of using nuclear
weapons can range from producing a political decision to
influencing an operation. 11
The manual identifies types of situations where the use of nuclear
weapons may be "favored over a conventional attack" or otherwise
preferred:
* Level of effort required for conventional targeting. If the target is
heavily defended such that heavy losses are expected, a nuclear
weapon may be favored over a conventional attack.
* Length of time that a target must be kept out of action. A nuclear
weapon attack will likely put a target out of action for a longer period
of time than a conventional weapon attack.
* Logistic support and anticipation of delays caused by the "fog and
friction" of war. Such delays are unpredictable and may range from
several hours to a number of days. 9
As to the purpose for using nuclear weapons, the manual states:
18.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, PUB 3-12.1,

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR

OPERATIONS
(Feb.
9,
1996),
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new pubs/jp3 12_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) (emphasis
omitted).
19.

Id. at 111-4 (emphasis omitted).

456 ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 8:447
The purpose of using nuclear weapons can range from
producing a political decision at the strategic level of war
to being used to influence an operation in some segment of
the theater. Operations employing nuclear weapons will
have a greater impact on a conflict than operations
involving only conventional weapons.20
The manual identifies "enemy combat forces and facilities that may be
likely targets for nuclear strikes":
0 WMD ["weapons of mass destruction," including chemical
biological, and nuclear weapons] and their delivery systems, as well
as associated command and control, production, and logistical support
units;
0 Ground combat units and their associated command and control
and support units
* Air defense facilities and support installations;
* Naval installations, combat vessels, and associated support
facilities and command and control capabilities;
0 Nonstate actors (facilities and operation centers) that possess
WMD; and
*

2
Underground facilities'.

VIII. ADDITIONAL ISSUES
There are some other legal issues implicated in this overall question
which I do not have time to go into in detail but which I believe deserve
much more attention than they have gotten, and which I would like to
address briefly.
In its written and oral presentations to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in the recent Nuclear Weapons Advisory Case, defending
nuclear weapons, the United States expressed or assumed the following
positions:
* The United States contended that the anticipated effects from the
use of nuclear weapons would have to necessarily and inevitably be
22
unlawful before the use would be unlawful.

20. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis omitted).
21. Id. at 111-6-7.
22. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 2, nn.58-62, 74, 88, and accompanying text.
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* The United States ignored the mens rea issues as the lawfulness of
the use of nuclear weapons, ignoring the potential for unlawfulness
based upon less than strict intentionality .23
* The United States argued that unlawfulness could only arise from
conventional or customary international law and not from general
principles of international law.2
* The United States assumed that one hundred percent applicability
is necessary before per se unlawfulness may incept.Y3
* The United States assumed that the principles of risk analysis are
irrelevant to the lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons.2
* The United States argued that the use of nuclear weapons could be
lawful as reprisals.27
IX. UNLAWFUL EFFECTS AS NOT INEVITABLE
The United States argument that unlawful effects would not be
inevitable begs the question. While the quantum of likelihood that must be
present for unlawfulness to incept is not an issue that appears to have been
broadly addressed or precisely defined in international law, there seems no
basis for imposing a standard of inevitability.2
The rules of
discrimination, necessity, and proportionality are rules of reason designed
to limit the use of weapons, before their use, based on their likely effects
in light of applicable military factors. The rules of international law as to
the mens rea or mental state necessary for war crimes culpability are
inconsistent with the assumption that inevitability must be present before
culpability incepts.
X. MENS REA
The lawfulness of our use of nuclear weapons involves issues as to
such lawfulness vis--vis the United States as actor and vis-a-vis the United
States civilian, military, industrial, and other leadership as actors.
Ultimately, it is individuals, not States, who are imprisoned or executed.
The law is clear that strict intentionality is not required for criminal
culpability for violation of the law of armed conflict. Willfulness,
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See id. at ch. 2, nn. 104-06 and accompanying text.
See id. at ch. 2, nn.40, 42-46, 50-53, and accompanying text.
See id. at ch. 2, nn.48, 49, 57, 59, 67-69, 74, 88, and accompanying text.
See id. at ch. 2, nn.71-74, 89 and accompanying text.
See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 2, nn.57, 129, and accompanying text.
See id. at ch. 1, nn.161, 172, 282, 286, ch. 8, nn.6-53 and accompanying text.
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recklessness, gross negligence, and even mere negligence are potential
bases for culpability.29 The actor need not have intended the unlawful
effects from the use of nuclear weapons; it will potentially be a sufficient
ground for war crimes culpability if he used such weapons notwithstanding
the known risks-and the risks of nuclear use or certainly known today.
Thus, The Air Force Manual on International Law recognizes the
sufficiency of gross negligence or deliberate blindness.30 The manual
quotes Spaight's statement of the rule:
In international law, as in municipal law intention to break
the law-mens rea or negligence so gross as to be the
equivalent of criminal intent is the essence of the offense.
A bombing pilot cannot be arraigned for an error of
judgment, it must be one which he or his superiors either
knew to be wrong, or which was, in se, so palpably and
unmistakenly a wrongful act that only gross negligence or
deliberate blindness could explain their being unaware of
its wrongness. 3'
It is also clear that the law of armed conflict generally recognizes
recklessness and other mental states less than strict intentionality as a basis
for war crimes liability.32 The Geneva conventions extensively provide for
criminal culpability for violations committed willfully," a state of mind
broadly recognized as encompassing recklessness.?' The law of armed
29.

See id. at ch. 1, nn.286, 289-95, and accompanying text, ch. 8 passim.

30. THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 15-3, 15-8 n.3 (citing
SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 57, 58 (1947)).

31. Id. at 15-8, n.13.
32.
id. ch 8.

See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 8, nn.6-15 and accompanying text. See generally

33. See id. ch. 8, nn.8-14 and accompanying text; THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L
LAW, supra note 2, at 15-1 to 15-2, 15-8 n.12 (quoting the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, adopted
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75

U.N.T.S. 85, and other Geneva Conventions).
34. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 8, nn.6-18 and accompanying text. See generally
id. ch. 8. See also GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART § 22, 59-62

(1953); Amnesty International-Report-IOR 40/10/98 May 1998 U.N., The International
Criminal Court Making the Right Choices-Part V Recommendations to the Diplomatic
Conference, available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/IOR400101998 (last visited
Feb. 8, 2002) (quoting ICRC Commentary to article 85 of Protocol I (1. 3474)); Commentary on
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Part V: Execution of the
Conventions and of this Protocol #Section II-Repression of Breaches of the Conventions and of
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conflict similarly recognizes criminal culpability for acts of wantonness
and of wanton destruction, acts also not reaching the level of strict
intentionality."
Similarly, in imposing war crimes culpability for "an attack which
may be expected to cause" certain impermissible effects, as prescribed, for
example, in Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 51(5), or for
acts that are "intended, or may be expected, to cause" certain
impermissible effects, as prescribed, in Protocol I, Article 35(3), the law
again recognizes potential culpability for war crimes committed with a
mental element of less than strict intentionality .36
So also, the law of armed conflict recognizes an extremely scope of
potential commander culpability for war crimes based on what the
commander "knew or should have known.""
While the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinions did not
focus on the question of the general mens rea requirements under the law
of armed conflict, a number of the judges made the point that information
as to the potential effects of nuclear weapons is so widely known and
available as to provide a basis for war crimes based on the use of such
weapons. Judge Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion, stated:
["By-products" or "collateral damage"] are known to be
the necessary consequences of the use of the weapon. The
author of the act causing these consequences cannot in any
coherent legal system avoid legal responsibility for causing
them, any less than a man careening in a motor vehicle at a
hundred and fifty kilometers per hour through a crowded
market street can avoid responsibility for the resulting

available at
85-Repression of breaches of this Protocol,
this Protocol, art.
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
35. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Statute of the
International Tribunal (Adopted May 25, 1993) (as amended May 13, 1998), art. 3(b), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm; Jordan J. Paust, The PreparatoryCommittee's
"Definition of Crimes"-War Crimes, 8 CRIM. L.F. 431, 438-41 (1997) (emphasis omitted)
(citing, inter alia, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 95/15 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523); Report of
the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N.
Doc. S/25704 & Add. 1 (1993), Annex, arts. 2(d), 3(b); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, pp.27, 41, 44
at
available
Yugo.),
Former
for
Trib.
Int'l
(Indictment,
(1995)
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
http://www.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglish/kar-ii950724e.htm;
INT'L PEACE, REPORTS OF MAJORITY AND DISSENTING REPORTS OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION OF RESPONSIBILITIES CONFERENCE OF PARIS, LISTS OF WAR
CRIMES (1919).
36.

Paust, supra note 35, at 438-41 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).

37.

Id. (citing, inter alia, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 757 (1948)).
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deaths on the ground that he did not intend to kill the
particular person who died.38
Judge Weeramantry added, "The plethora of literature on the
consequences of the nuclear weapon is so much part of common universal
knowledge today that no disclaimer of such knowledge would be
credible. "19

To the argument that the rule of moderation-the prohibition of the
use of arms "calculated to cause unnecessary suffering"-requires specific
intent, Judge Weeramantry cited the "well-known legal principle that the
doer of an act must be taken to have intended its natural and foreseeable
consequences."40 He also stated that reading into the law a requirement of
specific intent would not "take into account the spirit and underlying
rationale of the provision-a method of interpretation particularly
inappropriate to the construction of a humanitarian instrument.-14
Making a point that, as we saw above, is confirmed by the United
States' military manuals, 4 2 Judge Weeramantry added that nuclear weapons
"are indeed deployed 'in part with a view of utilizing the destructive
effects of radiation and fall-out.'"

3

As noted above, Judge Weeramantry reached a similar conclusion
with respect to the rights of neutrals: "The launching of a nuclear weapon
is a deliberate act. Damage to neutrals is a natural, foreseeable and,
indeed, inevitable consequence.""
Judge Weeramantry also emphasized the element of intent contained
in the policy of deterrence: "Deterrence needs to carry the conviction to
other parties that there is a real intention to use those weapons, it leaves
the world of make-believe and enters the field of seriously-intended
military threats. ",,1

38. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 901 (J Weeramantry,
dissenting).

39. Id.
40. Id. at 904.
41.

See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 3, note 313 and accompanying text.

42. See id. at ch. 29, notes 38-40, ch. 30 notes 14-22, and accompanying text.
43. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra notel2, at 904 (J Weeramantry, dissenting)
(citing Ian Brownlie, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 445 (1965)); DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at i, 1-6-7

(emphasis omitted).
44. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 905 (J. Weeramantry,
dissenting).
45. Id. at 919 (internal citations omitted).
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Judge Weeramantry concluded that the policy of deterrence provides
the element of intent:
[D]eterrence becomes stockpiling with intent to use. If one
intends to use them, all the consequences arise which
attach to intention in law, whether domestic or
One intends to cause the damage or
international.
devastation that will result. The intention to cause damage
or devastation which results in total destruction of one's
enemy, or which might indeed wipe it out completely,
clearly goes beyond the purposes of war.46
The challenging aspect of the evaluation of the lawfulness of the use
of nuclear weapons is the fact that-unlike the legal determinations made at
Nuremberg or in war crime trials generally-with nuclear weapons it is
obviously not a prudently available strategy to wait until after the weapons
are used to make the evaluation. While war crimes charges seem to have
rarely been brought based on risk taking that did not result in illicit effects,
nuclear weapons pose a threat that requires full and effective advance
47
evaluation and compliance if the applicable law is to be given effect.
That is perhaps the best way to conceptualize the nuclear threat: that
the rules of the law of war applicable to nuclear weapons will be
frustrated-in effect nullified-if they are not applied in advance.
XI.

WAR CRIMES CULPABILITY UNDER GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF

LAW
The law is clear that the rules of discrimination, proportionality and
necessity are binding as established principles of international law. The
United States is bound by these rules; if, under these rules, the use of
nuclear weapons would be unlawful, the United States is bound by such
It is not necessary that it independently agree by
unlawfulness.
convention, custom, or otherwise to such unlawfulness or even that it agree
with the conclusion that the rules of discrimination, proportionality, or
necessity render use unlawful.
The Air Force Manual on InternationalLaw thus states that the use of
a weapon may be unlawful based not only on "expressed prohibitions

46. Id.
47. The need for prudence in planning in this area goes also to the need for adequate
procurement of conventional weapons, so the United States will not find itself in a position of
needing to use nuclear weapons. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, nn.91-101, ch. 17,
nn.29-36, 45-50, ch. 18 n.5 and accompanying text.
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contained in specific rules of custom and convention," but also on "those
4
prohibitions laid down in the general principles of the law of war. "
Similarly, in discussing how the lawfulness of new weapons and
methods of warfare is determined, the manual states that such
determination is made based on international treaty or custom, upon
"analogy to weapons or methods previously determined to be lawful or
unlawful," and upon the evaluation of the compliance of such new
weapons or methods with established principles of law, such as the rules of
necessity, discrimination and proportionality .
The manual notes that the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg in the case of the Major War Criminals found that international
law is contained not only in treaties and custom but also in the "general
principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts."1
The Army's Law of Land Warfare states "[t]he conduct of armed
hostilities on land is regulated by the law of land warfare which is both
written and unwritten."'
Based on the foregoing, it seems clear that the use of nuclear weapons
can be unlawful per se regardless of whether there is a treaty or custom
establishing such unlawfulness.
XII. PREREQUISITES FOR A PER SE RULE
The question also arises as to what level or extent of unlawfulness
2
must be present for a per se rule to arise. The United States contended,
in a position that the ICJ ostensibly accepted sub silentio,"3 that one
hundred percent illegality-the unlawfulness of all uses of nuclear
weapons-would be necessary before a rule of per se illegality could arise.
48. THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 6-1, 6-9 n.3. See also
MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, nn.14-18, 24, ch. 2, nn.42-49 and accompanying text.

49. See THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 6-7; MOXLEY, supra
note 13, at ch. 1, nn.25 and accompanying text.
50. THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 1-6. See also MOXLEY,
supra note 13, at ch. 1 n.26 and accompanying text.
51. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 3 (FM27-10
July 18, 1956) with Change No. 1 (July 15, 1976) [hereinafter THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE].
See also MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1 n.3 and accompanying text.
52. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, nn.314-20, ch. 2 n.26 and accompanying text;
THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 6-3; THE NAVAL/MARINE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 10-2; Op. I.C.J. (1995), Legality of the Use by a
State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 17, at 90.

53. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 3, nn.237-45 and accompanying text; Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 822, 823, 829; 937 (J. Higgins, dissenting), 915
(J. Weeramantry, dissenting).
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To the extent one concludes, as I have, that all or "virtually all" uses of
nuclear weapons would be unlawful, either because the resultant effects,
particularly radiation and escalation, would be uncontrollable, or because
any such use would be likely to precipitate impermissible effects, or would
involve the risk of precipitating extreme impermissible effects, the issue of
whether unlawfulness in one hundred percent or virtually one hundred
percent of cases is required is not reached.
If one concludes, however, that the United States position-that some
uses could potentially be lawful-has merit, one reaches the question of the
prerequisites for a per se rule.
The ICJ ostensibly assumed that the use of nuclear weapons could be
held per se unlawful only if all uses would be unlawful in all
circumstances. This appears, for example, from the Court's conclusions
that it does not have sufficient facts to determine that nuclear weapons
would be unlawful "in any circumstance,"" that the proportionality
principle may not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in selfdefense "in all circumstances,"" and that, for the threat to use nuclear
weapons implicit in the policy of deterrence to be unlawful, it would have
to be the case that such use would "necessarily violate the principles of
56
necessity and proportionality."
However, the Court's approach may have been affected by the
wording of the question referred to it by the General Assembly: "Is the
threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under
57
international law?"
This issue deserves more attention. There are numerous bases for
inferring that, under widely accepted principles of law, a per se rule can
arise under circumstances of less than one hundred percent applicability,M
and that this is particularly appropriate where unlawfulness would exist in
the vast majority of cases and the potential benefits of avoiding the
repercussions of unlawful uses exceed the benefits of using such weapons
in instances of putative lawfulness. 9 A number of the judges of the ICJ, in

54. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 829. See MOXLEY, supra note
13, at ch. 3, nn.9, 30, 43, 237, 245, 249, and accompanying text.
55. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 822. See MOXLEY, supra note
13, at ch. 3, nn.30, 62, 237-42, 303 and accompanying text.
56.

Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 823.

57. Id. at 811 (question presented to the Court by U.N. General Assembly resolution
49/75 K, adopted Dec. 15, 1994).
58.

See, e.g., MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 4, nn.3-13 and accompanying text.

59.

See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 4, nn.3-5, 10, 25-31, 37-39, and accompanying
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their individual opinions, addressed the issue. Judge Shahabuddeen stated,
"[I]n judging of the admissibility of a particular means of warfare, it is
necessary, in my opinion, to consider what the means can do in the
ordinary course of warfare, even if it may not do it in all circumstances."60
Judge Weeramantry, addressing the issue from the perspective of
nuclear decision-making, concluded that nuclear weapons should be
declared illegal in all circumstances, with the proviso that if such use
would be lawful "in some circumstances, however improbable, those
circumstances need to be specified."61 Judge Weeramantry stated:
A factor to be taken into account in determining the
legality of the use of nuclear weapons, having regard to
their enormous potential for global devastation, is the
process of decision-making in regard to the use of nuclear
weapons.
A decision to use nuclear weapons would tend to be taken,
if taken at all, in circumstances which do not admit of fine
legal evaluations. It will, in all probability, be taken at a
time when passions run high, time is short and the facts are
unclear. It will not be a carefully measured -decision taken
after a detailed and detached evaluation of all relevant
circumstances of fact. It would be taken under extreme
pressure and stress. Legal matters requiring considered
evaluation may have to be determined within minutes,
perhaps even by military rather than legally trained
personnel, when they are in fact so complex as to have
engaged this Court's attention for months. The fate of
humanity cannot fairly be made to depend on such a
decision.
Studies have indeed been made of the process of nuclear
decision-making and they identify four characteristics of a
nuclear crisis. These characteristics are:
1. The shortage of time for making crucial decisions.
This is the fundamental aspect of all crises.

60. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 869 (J. Shahabuddeen,
dissenting).
61.

Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 915 (J.

dissenting).
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2. The high stakes involved and, in particular, the
expectation of severe loss to the national interest.
3. The high uncertainty resulting from the inadequacy of
clear information, e.g., what is going on?, What is the
intent of the enemy?; and
4.
The leaders are often constrained
considerations, restricting their options.62

by political

Judge Weeramantry further concluded that, even if there were a
nuclear weapon that totally eliminated the dissemination of radiation and
was not a weapon of mass destruction the Court, because of the technical
difficulties involved, would not be able "to define those nuclear weapons
which are lawful and those which are unlawful," and accordingly that the
Court must "speak of legality in general terms."63
Even using the United States formulation of requiring one hundred
percent unanimity, there is room for "sub-classes" of per se unlawfulness.
Based on the Court's decision, there is a basis for concluding that the use
of strategic nuclear weapons and the wide scale use of tactical nuclear
weapons or their use in urban areas, would be per se unlawful." As far as
equipment is concerned, this would ostensibly render unlawful the use of
something on the order of eighty percent of the nuclear weapons in the
United States' active arsenal. As far as circumstances are concerned, this
would ostensibly render unlawful a very large portion of the instances in
which the United States might use such weapons.
To the objection that such piecemeal illegalization would be
incomplete or unworkable, the answer is that we already have something
analogous in practice and that, in any event, social and political evolution,
like chance in catastrophe theory,5 work in sequential steps as well as
jumps. Incrementalism in the right direction is not necessarily bad, and
can be infinitely better than nothing, particularly if it is the most that is
available at a particular point in time.
62. Id. (citing Conn Nugent, How a Nuclear War Might Begin, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF

NUCLEAR WAR 117).
It is unclear whether Judge Koroma in his dissenting opinion, in
63. Id. at 922.
concluding that the use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful "in any circumstance," was

assuming that per se illegality required every possible use be unlawful. See id at 925.
64. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 3, nn.10-11 and accompanying text. See, e.g.,
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 829, 835.
65.

See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 22, nn.46-59 and accompanying text.
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As to the workability of partial limitations, the United States has
already undertaken numerous such limitations. In addition to the pledge
not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries, 6 the United
States has agreed not to use nuclear weapons, subject to certain conditions:
in Latin America, pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco of February 14,
1967;61 in the South Pacific, pursuant to the Treaty of Rarotonga of August
6, 1985;6 in Southeast Asia, pursuant to the Southeast Asia NuclearWeapon-Free Zone Convention of December 15, 1995;69 in Africa,
pursuant to the nuclear weapons free zone convention signed on April 1,
1996;10 and in the Antarctic, pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.11
So also, the United States, in its appearance before the ICJ in the

Nuclear Weapons Advisory case, strongly reassured the Court that the
United States doctrine of nuclear deterrence is purely of a defensive
nature, such that the United States would never use such other weapons
72
other than in a defensive mode.
It could be said that this issue as to the prerequisites for a per se rule
is semantic, because many per se rules are themselves generally subject to
exceptions and qualifications. 73 Nonetheless, on the assumption that law
matters, it seems clear that, were the United States to recognize the per se

unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons, in whole or in part, even if
there were qualifications and footnotes to the recognition, a powerful step
would have been taken.

XILI. RISK ANALYSIS
To what extent may any one State put protected persons and indeed
the whole human venture at risk in an attempt to further the State's own
military objectives, even its survival?

66. See id. ch. 30 n.75 and accompanying text.
67. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 824. Other nuclear States
imposed further limitations on their ratification of the Protocol. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at

ch. 3, nn. 127-33 and accompanying text.
68. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 824-25.
69. See id. at 826.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 825.
72. See Op. I.C.J. (1995), Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17, at 86. See also
MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 2, nn.130-35 and accompanying text.
73. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 4, nn.3-5, 10-13, 16-30, 41-42, and accompanying
text. See also id. ch. 30 n.151 and accompanying text.
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In any such circumstance in which these weapons might be used,
whether intentionally or by mistake, is it not ineluctably the case that there
would be some risk of the occurrence of extreme effects, given the
potential destructiveness of the weapons, the inherent uncontrollability of
radiation, 4 and the overall potential for escalation, misperception, and loss
75
of command and control?
This is clear, I submit, even from Judge Schwebel's example of the
targets
use of "tactical nuclear weapons against discrete military or naval
76
ensue."
not
would
casualties
civilian
substantial
that
so situated
The ICJ in its decision referenced similar arguments the United States
and Great Britain had made:
91. . . .The reality . . . is that nuclear weapons might be
used in a wide variety of circumstances with very different
results in terms of likely civilian casualties. In some cases,
such as the use of a low yield nuclear weapon against
warships on the High Seas or troops in sparsely populated
areas, it is possible to envisage a nuclear attack which
caused comparatively few civilian casualties. It is by no
means the case that every use of nuclear weapons against a
military objective would inevitably cause very great
7
collateral civilian casualties .

These examples, and the ones used by the United States and Great
Britain before the ICJ, appear to assume one of two things: that the
submarine in the ocean and the army in the desert or other such remote
targets would exist independently of the rest of the world, rather than being
affiliated with a State that either itself or with its allies has nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons that it is likely to use in response to
nuclear attack, and that the State using the nuclear weapons has no other
74. See id. ch. 29, nn. 41-124, and accompanying text.
75. See id. chs. 15, 25, 26, ch. 2, nn.63-87, ch. 15, nn.1-14, 33-43, 58-89, 99, 102-108,
ch. 16, nn.32-38, and accompanying text; NATO HANDBOOK ON THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF
NBC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, AMEDP-6(B), Part I, ch. 1, § 102(a) (1996) (adopted as Army
Field Manual 8-9, Navy Medical Publication 5059, Air Force Joint Manual 44-151); Carl Sagan,
Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 257, 273
(Winter 1983/1984). See also MOXLEY, supra note 13, at chs. 7-9, on weighing risks and the
legal relevance of risks. The escalation is particularly extreme, as has been recognized by the

civilian and military leadership of the United States and by defense experts throughout the
nuclear era. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at chs. 24, 25.

76. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 839 (J. Schwebel, dissenting).
77. Id. at 829 (citing United Kingdom, Written Statement 1 3.70 at 53 and United States of
America Oral Statement, CR 95/34 at 89-90). See also MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, n.29
and accompanying text.
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enemies that might find the attack provocative and retaliate; or that the
potential escalation by the attacked State or other party is not relevant to
the analysis.
Neither assumption seems reasonable. As the United States has
recognized, the legality evaluation is to be made in light of all available
facts as to potential risk factors."8 Although it may be possible that there
could be a scenario where the submarine or the army in the desert and the
related conflict existed independently of the rest of the world, such a
prospect seems so remote as to preclude its constituting the basis, on any
rational level, for the overall lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons.
Interestingly, Judge Schwebel recognized the legal point that if a use
of nuclear weapons could cause severe effects, it would be unlawful:
At one extreme is the use of strategic nuclear weapons in
quantities against enemy cities and industries. This socontrasted with
use (as
called
"countervalue"
"counterforce" uses directly only against enemy nuclear
forces and installations) could cause an enormous number
of deaths and injuries, running in some cases into the
millions; and, in addition to those immediately affected by
the heat and blast of those weapons, vast numbers could be
affected, many fatally, by spreading radiation. Large-scale
"exchanges" of such nuclear weaponry could destroy not
only cities but countries and render continents, perhaps the
whole of the earth, uninhabitable, if not at once then
through longer-range effects of nuclear fallout. It cannot
be accepted that the use of nuclear weapons on a scale
which would-or could-result in the deaths of many
millions in indiscriminate inferno and by far-reaching
fallout, have profoundly pernicious effects in space and
time, and render uninhabitable much or all of the earth,
could be lawful. 9
The ICJ, as we have seen, concluded that it had not been given
sufficient facts to resolve the issue:

78. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, nn.84-93, 109-120, 161, ch. 5, nn.3-4, ch. 6,
nn.26-27, ch. 29, nn.125-127 and accompanying text; THE AIR FORCE MANUAL ON INT'L LAW,
supra note 2, at 1-8, 1-9 (citing SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 57, 58 (1947)); 11
INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMP. LAW, Torts § 2-114 (1983).
79. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 839 (J. Schwebel, dissenting)
(emphasis added). See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, n.38 and accompanying text.
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95 .... [N]one of the States advocating the legality of the
use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances,
including the "clean" use of smaller, low yield tactical
nuclear weapons, has indicated what, supposing such
limited use were feasible, would be the precise
circumstances justifying such use; nor whether such
limited use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use
of high yield nuclear weapons. This being so, the Court
does not consider that it has a sufficient basis for a
determination of the validity of this view.0

The Court declined to engage in risk analysis:
43. Certain States contend that the very nature of nuclear
weapons, and the high probability of an escalation of
nuclear exchanges, mean that there is an extremely strong
risk of devastation. The risk factor is said to negate the
possibility of the condition of proportionality being
complied with. The Court does not find it necessary to
embark upon the quantification of such risks; nor does it
need to inquire into the question whether tactical nuclear
weapons exist which are sufficiently precise to limit those
risks: it suffices for the Court to note that the very nature
of all nuclear weapons and the profound risks associated
therewith are further considerations to be borne in mind by
States believing they can exercise a nuclear response in
self-defense in accordance with the requirements of
proportionality."
This issue of risk analysis would appear to be the heart of the matter.
In a milieu in which the dominant policy of nuclear deterrence is inherently
provocative, the question of the extent to which any State may subject the
rest of the world, or any appreciable portion of it, to the risk of severe,
even apocalyptic, effects would appear to be one that must be addressed if
the law in this area is to be meaningful.
The applicability of risk analysis would seem to be recognized by the
United States statement of the proportionality test to the ICJ:

80. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 829, 894.
supra note 13, at ch. 3, n.31 and accompanying text.

See also MOXLEY,

81. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 12, at 822. See also MOXLEY, supra
note 13, at ch. 6, n.8 and accompanying text; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note
12, at 819, 821, 822, 829, 830.
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Whether an attack with nuclear weapons would be
disproportionate depends entirely on the circumstances,
including the nature of the enemy threat, the importance of
destroying the objective, the character, size and likely
effects of2 the device, and the magnitude of the risk to
civilians .
XIV.

DEFERRED LEGAL EVALUATION AS RISKING ABNEGATING THE

RULE OF LAW
Our current approach that each potential use of nuclear weapons must
be evaluated in the context of the particular use has the effect of largely
vitiating the rule of law. In the circumstances of a war where nuclear
weapons might be resorted to, the situation will likely be extremely
volatile; the fog of war will be thick (maybe even thicker than in wars of
the past, given the extent to which we are dependent on computer
controls); information will be incomplete and possibly inaccurate; passions
will be high; time will be short. The likelihood of reasoned application of
the law of armed conflict will be slight.
Our failure to come to grips with these the legal issues of nuclear
weapons now puts not just the rule of law but the continuation of human
civilization at risk. The United States is the indispensable leader; it alone
can start the process of change in this area.
Not by expecting quick success. Not by expecting a situation in
which we can quickly rid ourselves of these weapons or expect other
nuclear States to do so-but committing ourselves to a process that, in
perhaps our children's or grandchildren's time, will see the delegitimization of these weapons and progress on the road to ridding the
world of them.
XV. UNLAWFULNESS OF SECOND USE/REPRISALS

The concept of reprisal is one of justifying actions that would
otherwise be unlawful. But the United States recognizes as a requirement
for lawful reprisal that the strike be limited to that necessary to force the
adversary to cease its unlawful actions and that it satisfy proportionality. 3
If my factual conclusion is correct that the effects of nuclear weapons are
uncontrollable, it would seem that lawful reprisal would not be possible.
82. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 1, nn.75-108, ch. 2, nn.88-91 and accompanying
text.
83. See MOXLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 29, nn.227-42 and accompanying text (discussion
of the application of the law of reprisal to nuclear weapons).
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The probabilities are overwhelming that the second use would be
designed to punish the enemy and, not incidentally, in the case of a
substantial nuclear adversary, to use one's own nuclear assets before they
could be preemptively struck by the adversary, and to attempt to
preemptively strike the adversary's nuclear assets (many of which would
likely be "co-located" with civilian targets) before they could be used.
Even assuming adequate command and control, crucial decisions would
have to be made within a very short time and would likely be dictated
largely by existing war plans contemplating nuclear weapons use. The
notion of a second strike as limited to the legitimate objectives of reprisal
seems oxymoronic.
In addition, the United States, while it disputes the applicability to
nuclear weapons of the limitations upon reprisals imposed by Protocol I, 1
recognizes that the law of armed conflict, including that as to reprisals, is
subject to the limitations inherent in the purposes of the law of armed
conflict, such as preserving civilization and the possibility of the
restoration of the peace, purposes that would likely be exceeded by the use
of nuclear weapons.
Even if it were assumed that certain second uses of nuclear weapons,
although otherwise unlawful, might be legitimized as reprisals, such
legitimization-like the lawfulness of the limited use of a small number
low-yield nuclear weapons in remote areas asserted by the United States
before the ICJ-would only affect a small portion of the potential uses for
nuclear weapons contemplated by United States policy and planning. It
would leave unaffected the unlawfulness of the vast bulk of potential uses
and virtually the totality of likely possible uses, including first uses against
conventional, chemical and biological weapons targets, second uses
intended to defeat and destroy the enemy, disproportionate second uses,
and other high-megatonnage nuclear strikes with likely extreme effects.
XVI. OUR NATIONAL INTEREST
Paradoxically, all of this is in even our short term interest. We no
longer need these weapons. Not only do they pose more of a risk than a
solution to any military threat. We can in fact, with our greatly expanded
conventional weapons and particularly with the precision with which we
can deliver payloads, now achieve with conventional weapons potentially
all of the military missions for which we might previously have considered
resorting to nuclear weapons.

84. See id. ch. 1, nn.274-77 and accompanying text; ch. 2, nn. 127-129 and accompanying
text. See also ch. 3, nn.246-249 and accompanying text.
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I submit that virtually any use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful,
and that the lessons of September lth should unify us in a broad
determination to the delegitimization of all uses of weapons threatening
terroristic effects.

